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California is often considered the model for tobacco-control programs due to its early adoption 
of comprehensive programs aimed at lowering tobacco consumption. Tobacco control began 
when voters approved the California Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act of 1988. More than 
$2 billion has been spent on tobacco-control in California since 1988. The findings of this article 
indicate that tobacco-control spending is a significant factor for the widening gap between 
consumption in the United States and in California only in equations that exclude cigarette prices 
and smoking bans as control variables. When significant, however, estimates suggest that, for 
every $1 increase in tobacco-control spending per capita, the sales gap widens by only 0.11 to 
0.18 cigarette packs per capita, or roughly 2 to 4 cigarettes per capita. This study suggests that 
future research should address the complexity of interactions among tobacco-control programs, 
cigarette prices, and smoking bans. 
 
1. Introduction 
 California is often considered the model for tobacco-control programs due to its early 
adoption of comprehensive programs that included tax increases, tobacco-control spending on 
health education and counter-advertising, and smoking bans in public places. Tobacco control 
began in 1988 when voters approved the California Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act of 
1988 (Proposition 99), which increased the state surtax on cigarettes by 25cents per pack. 
Revenues from the new tax were earmarked for tobacco-related disease research, health 
education against tobacco, and health care for medically indigent families. The authorizing 
legislation established the goal of reducing tobacco consumption by 75 percent in California by 
1999. 
 Slightly more than $2 billion has been spent in California on tobacco control during 
1989-2002, or roughly $62 per capita during this period. The California Department of Public 
Health (2005) argued that tobacco control programs have been effective because California’s 
adult smoking rate dropped to a historic low of 15.4 percent in 2004, a 32.5 percent decrease 
since 1988. Figure 1 displays the tax-paid per capita cigarette sales (in packs) in California and 
demonstrates that sales fell in most years since 1974. Sales of 127 packs per capita in 1974 
decreased to 36 packs in 2002, a dramatic reduction of 72 percent. Figure 1 also shows that sales 
fell 47 percent for the nation as a whole, from 135 packs to 72 packs, during this same period. In 
2002, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) called for more than $1.5 billion in 
additional tobacco-control spending in that year alone for the nation, based in part on its 
evaluation of the success of the tobacco-control program in California. In 2002, for instance, 
CDC estimated that, although total state tobacco-control expenditures were $862 million or 
$3.16 per capita, spending in all states was roughly 56 percent of the ‘‘lower-bound’’ or 
minimum best practices funding recommendation for that year. 
 It is unlikely that falling cigarette sales is solely the product of tobacco-control programs. 
Growing awareness of health risks associated with smoking as well as increased availability of 
various pharmaceutical aids for smoking cessation might also cause falling demand for cigarettes 
by Californians.4 Although tobacco-control programs themselves may promote greater 
awareness of health risks, it is doubtful that the effect on sales from rising health concerns stems 
entirely from California’s tobacco-control program.5 Rising cigarette prices that followed excise 
tax hikes and the Master Settlements Agreement (MSA) are commonly believed to reduce 
consumption as well. Higher prices also promote purchases from lower-tax jurisdictions that will 
result in cigarette sales that are not counted as cigarette sales in California. Rising Internet sales 
from sellers outside of California may also have contributed to some of the reduction of sales in 
California, thus suggesting that some of the reduction in cigarette sales may be illusionary. 
 This study examines the effectiveness of California’s tobacco-control programs using a 
model of the cigarette sales gap between the nation and California during 1975-2002 that 
controls for prices, income, smoking bans, and smuggling. Previous research that focused on 
California did not control for many factors outside of the tobacco-control programs themselves 
and examined data no later than 1993. California is an obvious choice for a focused examination 
due to its long-standing tobacco-control program and because CDC recommendations for state 
spending increases are partially based on their interpretation of past evidence on the California 
program. 
 
2. Literature on Tobacco-Control Programs 
 The literature often fails to examine factors other than tobacco-control programs when 
evaluating effectiveness of these programs. In their comprehensive assessment of the literature, 
Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) concluded that most studies simply perform trend 
analysis surrounding the introduction of new tobacco-control programs and fail to control for 
price effects and other factors that might also be influencing consumption. When tobacco 
consumption falls following a particular policy event, authors incorrectly conclude that tobacco-
control programs are the sole cause of the reduction. For example, Manley et al. (1997) 
concluded that per capita monthly sales fell in states participating in the American Stop Smoking 
Intervention Study (ASSIST) program when compared to states not participating. Other factors 
that might have led to such a decline were not considered. It is possible that states participating 
in ASSIST exhibit falling cigarette consumption simply because their citizens express decreasing 
tolerance for smoking, which then fosters public support for ASSIST that is not as evident in 
states that do not participate. 
 Although consumption is falling, it is not clearly the result of participation in ASSIST. 
Pierce et al. (1998) concluded that California’s control programs significantly lowered tobacco 
use, but they did not control for factors that might also contribute to such a change. These and 
other studies suggest little about the influence of tobacco-control programs. 
 Four studies control for one or more factors outside of the tobacco-control programs 
themselves and therefore contribute more to our understanding of how these programs contribute 
to falling consumption throughout time. Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995a) controlled for state excise 
taxes and tobacco firm media expenditures when concluding that state government media 
expenditures, or counteradvertising, lowered cigarette consumption in California. They measured 
tobacco-control expenditures as ‘‘media placement expenditures’’ by the Tobacco-Control 
Section of the California Department of Health Services and calculated that California spent 
almost $20 million during 1980-1993. This initial effort at measuring control focused on the 
media campaign portion of the tobacco-control program, and, as discussed below, recent data 
indicate that during 1989-2002, media spending was roughly one-sixth of total spending on 
tobacco-control programs. Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995b) estimated that sales of cigarettes in 
California were reduced by 819 million packs from the third quarter of 1990 through the fourth 
quarter of 1992 owing to an additional 25-cent state tax increase. They also used antismoking 
media campaign dollars as a proxy for tobacco-control spending. 
 Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) examined the influence of state tobacco-
control expenditures on cigarette sales during 1981-2000 in the fifty states and concluded that 
increased expenditures lower cigarette sales after controlling for excise taxes, smuggling, time, 
and other statespecific factors. They collected their own data from federal, state, and private 
funding sources, and concluded that past and current tobacco-control spending lowered current 
cigarette consumption. They also examined evidence from the four states with the longest history 
of such programs (Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon) and found similar 
conclusions when data on these four states were grouped together. Estimation was not conducted 
on California alone. Using data collected by the authors on expenditures of tobacco-control 
programs, Tauras et al. (2005) concluded that per capita state-level spending on tobacco control 
lowered youth smoking prevalence and the number of cigarettes smoked by smokers during 
1991-2000. California was not singled out for examination in this study either. 
 This literature survey indicates that examination of more recent data on California is an 
obvious avenue for further research because data from 1993 are from the last year in which 
California was specifically studied. Past studies that focused on California also only examined 
media campaign spending and so did not fully examine spending in the overall tobacco-control 
program. More recent studies have not focused on California and, as discussed above, relied on 
author-derived estimates that were not publicly available.7 Fortunately, expenditure data on 
tobacco control in California are now publicly available and span the period 1989-2002, which 
allows us to focus on program effectiveness in California throughout a relatively long period and 
on the overall program itself. Data on media campaign spending are also available during this 
period and are examined. 
 Most studies do not control for marketing by tobacco firms that may partially overturn 
effects of tobacco-control programs on tobacco consumption. For example, researchers have 
argued that the effectiveness of tobacco-control programs is diminished when spending by 
tobacco firms on marketing increases following major policy events such as tax increases and 
tobacco settlements.8 More recent studies discussed above—Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka 
(2003), and Tauras et al. (2005)—do not control for marketing by tobacco firms. Unfortunately, 
California-specific data on tobacco advertising are not available and so are not examined here. It 
would appear inappropriate to simply assume that the amount of spending by tobacco companies 
is proportionate to the California population. Its inclusion would likely lead to various questions 
about what effect its inclusion in this form would exert on the empirical results of this article and 
would also make it more difficult to compare the results here with those of previous studies. 
 It is, of course, difficult to fully account for all of the factors that influence tobacco 
consumption such as tax evasion and higher prices, as well as to completely parse out the 
independent effects of the California tobacco program. Program activities might have been 
instrumental in changing social norms in ways that led to subsequent tax hikes and smoking bans 
or greater health concerns that ultimately led to lower cigarette sales. Similarly, state and local 
smoking bans in public places may have curbed cigarette sales as well, and part of this effect 
might stem from the tobacco-control program. 
 Gilpin, Lee, and Pierce (2004) examined changes in population attitudes about where 
smoking should not be allowed. They reported significant increases in percentages of California 
adults stating that smoking should not be allowed in many public places in 1998-1999 compared 
to 1992-1993. Only modest increases were found for adults in states other than California. They 
concluded that California’s tobacco-control program was a significant factor behind why social 
norms in California changed more rapidly than in the rest of the nation. 
 Although it is impossible to know what proportion of any changes in cigarette sales might 
stem from these dynamics, the possibility of complex interactions suggests the importance of 
conducting a rather broad empirical approach to examining how the tobacco-control program has 
influenced cigarette sales. One way to address the complexity of interactions is to examine 
several empirical specifications of how the tobacco-control program might affect sales. A first 
step is to examine if contemporaneous spending influences sales. A second step is to examine if 
inclusion of various lagged values of spending also influences sales. Finally, a cumulative 
measure of spending is considered following previous studies by Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995a) 
and Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) that discounted past spending with a discount rate 
of 5 percent. This measure has been proposed as a way to test whether it takes many years of 
tobacco-control activity before full effects of that program can be uncovered. 
The present study also considers discount rates of 10, 15, and 20 percent 
because a 5 percent rate is clearly arbitrary.  
 Another consideration that follows from our discussion is that examining effects of 
tobacco-control spending in equations that also control for cigarette prices and smoking bans 
may underestimate effects of spending. Excluding prices and bans may, however, overestimate 
effects from spending. It would thus appear prudent to illustrate how effects from tobacco-
control expenditures are sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of smoking bans and prices. 
Regressions are therefore run with and without controls for cigarette prices and smoking bans. 
 Controlling for time is another area that deserves careful consideration because standard 
error estimates in regressions are biased downward in the presence of positive serial correlation. 
As demonstrated in figure 1, tobacco consumption has fallen throughout most years in 
California. Past studies have simply taken a simple time trend as in Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995a, 
1995b), or a quadratic time trend as in Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003). Both methods 
raised serious concerns over multicollinearity in the present article. Examination of prices, 
smuggling, income, time, smoking ban, and the tobacco-control spending variables indicated 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) in excess of 10 for price, smoking ban, time, time squared, and 
cumulative spending variables.10 A value of 10 is commonly used as the threshold for concern. 
Variables with very high VIF ranges were price (range: 25-33), time squared (range: 25-100), 
income (range: 8-17), and cumulative spending (range: 13-50). 
 It is important to remember that the goal of controlling for time is to capture secular 
trends that are independent of the effects of the tobacco-control program, and, because this 
indicates a difficult challenge with no control states, it would appear superior to drop time 
altogether by examining the difference between cigarette consumption in the United States and 
consumption in California rather than simply examine consumption in California throughout 
time. As discussed below, VIFs of independent variablesin this article’s models of the sales gap 
mostly exhibit values lower than 10. This sales gap specification is also consistent with the 
commonly held view that California’s tobacco-control program is an important reason for why 
California’s cigarette consumption has fallen more rapidly than that of the nation as a whole. An 
average gap of 24.17 packs per capita during 1975-2002 indicates that California consumed 
substantially less than the nation as a whole. The gap also widened during this period from 7.8 
packs to 35.9 packs. 
 In sum, this study provides the following innovations. It examines California’s tobacco-
control program using data on overall spending as well as media spending during 1989-2003. 
1993 is the last year in which California was separately examined, and earlier studies focused on 
the media campaign portion of the tobacco-control program. This article also examines if the 
difference between consumption in the United States and California is influenced by the tobacco-
control program to examine the commonly held view that this program is an important influence 
for why consumption in California has declined more rapidly than consumption in the nation. 
 
3. Estimating Effects of Tobacco Control on Tobacco Use 
 Equation (1) models the effects of California’s tobacco-control program on the sales gap 
between the United States and California, holding constant other factors that might contribute to 
changes in consumption. The dependent variable CIGGAP is the number of tax-paid per capita 
cigarette sales (in packs) in the United States minus sales in California, and is obtained from 
Orzechowski and Walker (2004): 
 
CIGGAP = f (PRICEGAP; SMUG; YGAP; BAN; CONTROL); (1)  
 
where PRICEGAP is the real (in 2003 dollars) price gap of packs of cigarettes in the United 
States and California, as reported in Orzechowski and Walker (2004), and is hypothesized to be 
inversely related to the consumption gap. A rising price gap would indicate that prices in the 
United States are now relatively higher than in California and therefore consumption in the 
United States should fall relatively more, thus lowering the gap in sales between the United 
States and California. 
 As discussed previously, data on tax-paid cigarette sales in California are distorted 
because Californians purchase some portion of cigarettes outside of this calculation. Even though 
taxed sales in California have fallen rapidly, this trend overstates the extent that Californians 
have lowered consumption. High-tax states are expected to lose some portion of total sales to 
neighboring states with lower tax rates, and therefore taxed sales are too high in states from 
which cigarettes are bootlegged and too low in states to which cigarettes are smuggled. The 
Legislative Analyst’s Office (2003) of the California government has argued that the decline in 
smoking is overstated due to stamp counterfeiting, cross-border smuggling, Internet purchases, 
and export redirection (redirecting cigarettes meant for export to other jurisdictions back into the 
state so as to circumvent taxation). This report discusses a recent survey by the California tax 
authority that found that one-third of the retail outlets had cigarettes with counterfeit stamps. The 
tax authority also calculated that the loss in excise tax revenue from a load of cigarettes in a 
fourteen-foot truck would be $180,000 and would approach the mid– to high hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in a twenty-four-foot truck, thus demonstrating significant financial 
incentives for smugglers. 
 SMUG controls for estimation bias and is defined as the ratio of the tax in California to 
the average of taxes for bordering states (Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona). There is no value for a 
national smuggling variable under our definition of smuggling, and therefore the model does not 
examine the differential incentive for smuggling in the United States versus in California. SMUG 
is hypothesized to exhibit a positive sign because higher values indicate greater incentives for 
California smokers to purchase from surrounding states offering lower taxes, which would then 
widen the sales gap in the United States minus in California. It should be noted that significance 
of variables that measure tax differentials of adjoining states is likely to diminish throughout 
time with rising Internet sales because distance from seller becomes less important for buyers 
when they have access to low-tax cigarettes over the Internet. Many Internet merchants are 
located in low-tax states such as North Carolina, Virginia, and Kentucky, as well as on American 
Indian reservations that sell untaxed cigarettes, thus suggesting that tax differentials between 
bordering states are becoming a less useful means of controlling for the effect of this activity on 
a state’s cigarette sales (General Accounting Office [GAO] 2002). 
 YGAP controls for the gap in income between the United States and California. Income 
is defined as real per capita personal income and is obtained from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.11 The expected sign in YGAP is positive when cigarettes are normal goods. Higher 
income gaps are predicted to lead to more consumption in the nation relative to consumption in 
California, and therefore CIGGAP is expected to rise as a result. 
 California passed a statewide smoking ban in public places in 1994 that was fully 
implemented in 1998. Yurekli and Zhang (2000) found that smoking restrictions lead to lower 
state per capita cigarette consumption in a model that controls for price, income, smuggling, 
education, and various demographic variables. A smoking ban variable is constructed that 
calculates the percentage of the California population that was subjected to state and local 
smoking bans in public places (workplaces, restaurants, and bars) throughout the range of the 
study.12 This variable was constructed using data on the population covered by such bans 
obtained from American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation (2006), and then comparing it to state 
population for each year obtained from the California Statistical Abstract (California Department 
of Finance 2006). National comparisons are not calculated for the smoking ban variable, 
although a few states adopted restrictive bans as well during the period of our study. California 
may, however, be considered an outlier among the states because it is one of four states with a 
long-standing history of a comprehensive tobacco-control program, and so it is assumed that 
national values of the smoking ban variable are zero. It is hypothesized that the smoking ban 
variable positively influences the sales gap because if the ban lowers smoking in California, the 
consumption gap between the United States and California should widen. 
 It should be noted, however, that states that adopt smoking bans may be more likely to 
have lower smoking rates and smoking rates that fall more quickly than other states. Dunham 
and Marlow (2000) concluded that the presence of a state smoking law is influenced by whether 
a state has a significant tobacco presence. Boyes and Marlow (1996) found evidence of many 
smoke-free restaurants prior to passage of a smoking ban in one of the earliest (San Luis Obispo) 
cities in California to adopt such a ban. Hersch, Del Rossi, and Viscusi (2004) found that state 
smoking laws are responsive to voter preferences in a state. It is possible, then, that introduction 
of a smoking ban may exert little or no effect on tobacco use if the smoking ban is passed after a 
significant and earlier reduction in consumption. In other words, smoking bans may follow 
changes in smoking behavior rather than cause such changes. Of course, the ban could also 
simply lower social costs of smoking as consistent with stated objectives of the law without 
lowering tobacco consumption. The effect of the smoking ban, then, is an empirical issue to be 
decided by the data. 
 CONTROL measures tobacco-control program size in California and is an estimate of the 
real per capita expenditures on these programs as published in Ibrahim and Glantz (2003). These 
estimates were compared to the 1989-2000 series in the 2002 California Tobacco-Control Update 
publication of the California Department of Health Services and were comparable as 
demonstrated by a correlation coefficient of 0.94. Data in Ibrahim and Glantz (2003) are used 
because they provide a longer data set, or 1989-2002. Values are set to $0 prior to 1989 
following Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003), who argued that preintervention data 
isolate the impact of tobacco-control programs on tobacco use. Lagged values of per capita 
tobacco-control expenditures are also considered following Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka 
(2003), who found contemporaneous and lagged effects of tobacco-control expenditures on 
cigarette consumption. Lags from one to two years are considered to determine whether prior 
spending exerts significant effects on current cigarette consumption. Finally, cumulative 
measures of spending are considered following previous studies by Hu, Sung, and Keeler 
(1995a) and Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003) that discounted past spending with a 
discount rate of 5 percent. This measure has been proposed as a way to test whether it takes 
many years of tobacco-control activity before full effects of that program can be uncovered. 
Estimations using discount rates of 10, 15, and 20 percent are also considered. 
 National comparisons are not calculated for tobacco control expenditures because there 
are no comparable data with which comparisons can be made. This should not, however, pose a 
problem because the tobacco-control program in California is an outlier among most states, and 
so it is assumed that national values of these same variables are zero. Expenditures are 
hypothesized to exert positive effects on the sales gap between the United States and California 
when tobacco-control policies lead to falling consumption in California. 
 Unfortunately, data on tobacco-control spending are not fully disaggregated to uncover 
all activities being funded so as to examine whether all components of tobacco-control programs 
exert equal effects on cigarette consumption. As discussed below, however, data on tobacco-
control media expenditures are examined and include spending on print, radio, television, and 
billboard campaigns aimed at lowering tobacco use.  
 Variance inflation factors were calculated given the potential for collinearity in this 
model. Using the commonly used threshold value of 10 as a sign of potential problems, only 
cumulative measures of tobacco-control spending consistently exhibited values in excess of this 
threshold. VIF values for the various discounted measures were 5 percent rate (17), 10 percent 
rate (13), and 15 percent rate (13).13 Estimations using cumulative tobacco-control spending 
variables should therefore be considered more 
cautiously than estimations using contemporaneous and lagged expenditures. VIFs of all 
variables in equations that exclude price gap and smoking ban variables all exhibit values lower 
than 10, thus suggesting little concern for collinearity in these estimations. As noted above, 
however, effects of tobacco-control programs will tend to be overestimated in equations without 
price gap and smoking ban variables, and underestimated in equations with these variables. 
Table 1 displays summary statistics of all variables defined above for 1975-2002. 
 
4. Effects of Tobacco-Control Spending on Tobacco Sales 
 
 Table 2 displays estimates of the cigarette sales gap between the United States and 
California that control for cigarette price gaps and smoking bans. Price gap and smuggling 
variables never exert effects different from zero. Income gaps always exert positive effects on 
the sales gap and are consistent with expectations. Smoking bans exert positive effects in 
equations with contemporaneous and lagged tobacco-control spending, but do not exert 
significant effects on equations with cumulative measures of spending. No measure of tobacco-
control spending exerts effects that differ from zero. It is likely that these effects are 
underestimated when price gaps and smoking bans are included. Table 2 also lists Ljung-Box Q 
statistics to test for serial correlation, and their values indicate no concern, except for the 
equation with tobacco-control spending lagged two years. 
 Table 3 displays estimates of the cigarette sales gap that exclude controls for cigarette 
prices and smoking bans. Smuggling exerts positive effects in all equations except the one with 
cumulative spending discounted at 5 percent. Contemporaneous and lagged tobacco-control 
spending continue to exert no significant effects on the sales gap. All measures of cumulative 
spending exert positive and significant effects, thus indicating that California’s program has 
significantly widened the gap between sales in the United States and those in California. 
Previous discussion indicated that cumulative measures of spending exhibited VIFs in excess of 
10, and therefore caution should be exercised over the preciseness of estimated coefficients 
because collinearity is a concern. Estimates of cumulative spending elasticities (evaluated at 
means) are 0.18 (5 percent discount), 0.16 (10 percent discount), and 0.17 (15 percent discount). 
It is likely that these effects are overestimated because controls for cigarette prices and smoking 
bans are excluded. Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate the presence of serial correlation in equations 
with contemporaneous and lagged values of tobacco-control spending, but not in equations using 
cumulative measures of spending. 
 
5. Effects of Tobacco-Control Media Campaign Spending on Tobacco Sales 
 
 Total spending on media campaigns was $377,570,000 during 1989-2002. These 
expenditures are obtained from Ibrahim and Glantz (2003) and measure media spending such as 
television, radio, print, billboards, and contained messages on the tobacco industry, secondhand 
smoke, addiction, cessation, cigarette additives, smokeless tobacco, general health, pregnancy, 
and prevention among youth. Real per capita spending on media expenditures averaged $0.39 
during 1975-2003, with a range of $0.00-1.41. Consistent with earlier discussion, values of $0 
are assigned to preintervention years. Throughout 1975-2002, real total tobacco-control spending 
per capita averaged $2.29, and real media campaign spending per capita averaged $0.39, thus 
roughly indicating a sixfold difference in magnitude. When compared during the intervention 
period of 1989-2002, real total tobacco-control spending per capita averaged $4.59, and real 
media campaign spending per capita averaged $0.79.  
 A cumulative measure of media spending was calculated in the same manner as for 
overall tobacco-control spending to allow for all past expenditures to influence the sales gap. As 
before, past spending was discounted at rates of 5, 10, and 15 percent. 
 Table 4 displays estimates of the cigarette sales gap that control for cigarette price gaps 
and smoking bans. Consistent with the results in table 2, price gap and smuggling variables never 
exert effects different from zero. Income gaps always exert positive effects on the sales gap and 
are also consistent with the results in table 2. Smoking bans exert positive effects, as 
hypothesized, on the sales gap in equations with contemporaneous and spending lagged one year, 
but do not exert significant effects in any other equation. No measure of tobacco-control media 
spending exerts effects that differ from zero. Values of Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate no 
concern for serial correlation, except in the equation with spending lagged two years. 
 Table 5 displays estimates of the cigarette sales gap between the United States and 
California that exclude cigarette price gaps and smoking bans. Smuggling exerts no significant 
effects, even though it positively influenced the sales gap in table 3 that runs similar regressions 
using total tobacco-control expenditures. The income gap variable exerts positive influences on 
the sales gap and is consistent with results shown in previous tables. All measures of media 
spending exert significant and positive influences on the sales gap. These results are somewhat 
consistent with those in table 3, except only cumulative total tobacco-control spending was found 
to significantly influence the sales gap. Estimates of media spending elasticities (evaluated at 
means) exhibit the narrow range of 0.11 (15 percent discount) to 0.14 (5 percent discount). 
Again, media spending effects are probably overestimated because controls for cigarette price 
gaps and smoking bans are excluded. Ljung-Box Q statistics indicate presence of serial 
correlation in only the equation with spending lagged two years. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 Changes in income were an important factor for why cigarette consumption declined 
more rapidly in California than in the overall nation. Insignificance of price gap effects is 
interesting given the large literature demonstrating that price effects are robust and stable. It 
should be remembered, however, that this literature estimates effects of prices on consumption 
rather than price differences on consumption differences. Smokers in California have clearly 
been subject to a rising real price during the period of this study: from $1.65 to $4.42. But, real 
prices in the United States have risen from $1.64 to $4.05 during the same period. The real price 
gap between the United States and California has averaged only $0.19 during this period, with a 
range from –$0.62 to $0.10. It is likely, therefore, that the small range in the price gap explains 
why it does not exert a statistically significant influence on the sales gap. 
 Tobacco-control spending exerts a statistically significant influence on the gap between 
consumption in the United States and California only in equations that exclude cigarette price 
gaps and smoking bans. Equations with these controls are likely to underestimate effects from 
tobacco-control programs, and equations without these controls are likely to overestimate effects. 
The result that tobacco-control spending exerts significant influences only in equations without 
these control variables would appear consistent with previous discussion about complexities 
associated with parsing out independent effects of California’s tobacco-control program on sales. 
Although tobacco-control programs may exert independent effects on sales, it is also possible 
that these programs alter social norms in ways that might have contributed to subsequent tax 
hikes (and therefore higher prices), smoking bans, or greater health concerns that ultimately led 
to lower cigarette sales. Governments may as well view smoking bans, price hikes through tax 
increases, and tobacco-control programs as either substitutes or complements, thus suggesting 
further ambiguity on parsing out independent effects of tobacco-control programs. 
 Although tobacco-control spending exerted significant influences at times in equations 
that excluded cigarette price and smoking ban variables, effects are relatively inelastic. When 
statistically significant from zero, elasticity coefficients exhibited a relatively narrow range from 
0.11 to 0.18. These estimates suggest that, for every $1 increase in tobacco-control spending per 
capita, the sales gap widens by 0.11 to 0.18 cigarette packs per capita, or roughly 2 to 4 
cigarettes per capita. Previous discussion also indicated such estimates are probably overstated 
because they do not control for cigarette price and smoking ban variables. Nonetheless, these 
estimates provide information for debates regarding whether past spending on tobacco control 
yields sufficient reductions in cigarette consumption to justify continuation. 
 Although the empirical results indicate ambiguity about the independent effect of 
tobacco-control programs on the sales gap, this ambiguity would appear to be worth noting when 
analyzing past and future research in this area of public health policy. Within the context of 
studies that previously focused on California’s tobacco-control programs, it would appear that 
effects were overestimated because they did not control for cigarette prices and smoking bans. 
The present study also suggests that future studies that include these control factors would tend 
to underestimate effects of these programs on cigarette sales. To promote clearer understanding 
of the independent influences that tobacco-control programs exert on smoking, this article 
suggests that further research should focus on disentangling the various effects that smoking 
bans, price increases, and tobacco-control programs exert on cigarette consumption. 
 
Notes 
 
1. CDC (2001, 2002). 
2. See Ibrahim and Glantz (2003). Throughout the article, all dollar values are in real 
 2003 terms. The per capita calculation was computed using average California population 
 during this period. 
3. See CDC (2002) for spending recommendations. CDC (1999) discussed spending 
 recommendations based on ‘‘evidence-based’’ evaluations of programs in California, 
 Massachusetts, 
 Oregon, and Maine. 
4. Pierce and Gilpin (2002) concluded that, since becoming available over the counter in 
 1996, nicotine-replacement therapy became ineffective in increasing long-term successful 
 smoking cessation in California smokers. 
5. Tobacco-control programs of other states and federal programs may foster greater 
 awareness as well. 
6. See, for example, GAO (2002). 
7. For example, Tauras et al. (2005) calculated tobacco-control spending by adding real 
 per capita state excise tax funding with other state-appropriated funds earmarked for 
 these programs with real per capita nongovernmental spending and per capita tobacco- 
 control spending from the federal tobacco-control program and from American Stop 
 Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST), Initiatives to Mobilize for the Prevention and 
 Control of TobaccoUse (IMPACT), and SmokeLess States National Tobacco Policy 
 Initiative (supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the American Medical 
 Association). 
8. See, for example, Hu, Sung, and Keeler (1995a). 
9. To conserve space, regressions using the 20 percent rate of discount are not displayed 
 because overall results were unaffected. 
10. The time variables were time centered to correct for artificially inflated variance inflation 
 factors (VIFs). 
11. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007). 
12. The variable has a starting value of 0; then rises to 0.04 in 1991, 0.06 in 1992 and 
 1993, 0.13 in 1994, and 0.24 in 1995; and then stays at 1.0 for the rest of the period under 
 study. 
13. The only other variable with a VIF in excess of 10 was PRICEGAP. Although it 
 exhibited values of 13 in equations with a 5 percent discounted cumulative measure and 
 spending lagged two years, all other equations exhibited values less than 10. 
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